I like Paul Daley's columns generally, but in his 'armchair general' piece in the Guardian, he disappoints somewhat.
While I agree with his views on national security when it comes to geopolitical affairs as they currently appear to be in the broad, I do not agree with his analysis in the detail.
Sure, Australian govts ought to demand high level strategic goals from its thinktank coneheads and ADF platform-happy wanks, goals which can be tweaked politically (in terms of contemporary Foreign Affairs agenda) rather than getting a mishmash of perceived threats and platforms of choice to deal with these. Foremost though, those strategic goals ought to be articulated in a way which discounts allied help.
In general, I agree with 'stand off' capabilities (in whatever form this might require) which also doubles as credible deterrence (the weaponry required might be said to be bleedingly obvious).
But Daley's whole article is premissed on false assumptions. Towit: "It is harder to capture ground (including sea and airspace) than it is to hold it. All aggressors must attack into the unknown, bringing their support with them. Defenders, by contrast, can fall back on to a known space and the provisions it can supply."
Read more:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/apr/21/an-alternative-to-aukus-australia-strategic-defensive-approach
These assumptions just do not stand up to scrutiny. Look at history as far back as the Roman Empire or 1812 (just as Daley did to claim authority for his piece) and you will see it replete with examples of aggressors taking hold of 'the ground' with relative ease (at least initially) - the latest examples being Russia and China. While holding that gained territory is far from assured (in fact not assured and not easy at all).
Then there is the fact that today's intelligence collection and analysis has matured sufficiently for an aggressor to be confident enough to plan accordingly - Aggressors are no longer 'blind' though their leaderships might be but not for want of pertinent intelligence.
Australia being sparsely populated, its citizens, govt institutions, and defence establishmenst concentrated in or around large cities is easily targeted without having to put boots on the Continent (at least initially). One must remember that modern warfare is Total Warfare. Pin-point military strikes on military targets a la US is the norm for very limited campaigns only. Australia is also very vulnerable (360 degree access points in 4 dimensions) and 'defence in depth a la WWII Russia scorched earth strategy would utterly destroy Australia's capacity to resist an invasion of any kind (be it partial or complete) without external help. It's as simple as that.
I have not read Daley's book but if the assumptions he disclosed in his article are any indication of the book's work, I'm not sure it's worth the read.